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Political actors are often perceived as self-preserving, rational actors who rarely 
give power away voluntarily. Yet the proliferation of independent constitutional courts 
presents the puzzle of why politicians are willing to delegate, seemingly irrevocably, 
authority to institutions that will most certainly constrain the implementation of their 
policy preferences. A variety of hypotheses purport to explain this phenomenon of 
judicial empowerment, relying variously on economic factors, electoral strategy, 
international influences, ideology, and interest groups. My dissertation examines this 
larger question in light of the sudden transformation of France’s Constitutional Council 
into a potent constitutional court in October of 1974. France, with its long political 
tradition of hostility to American-style judicial review, provides perhaps the most 
dramatic example of judicialization. Drawing on research into elite attitudes, 
parliamentary debates, government and intra-party documents, and extensive newspaper 
reports, the project evaluates the claims of competing explanations of judicial 
empowerment in the French context, with an eye to their applicability in other industrial 
democratic states. It a future comparative inquiry into the genesis of constitutional courts, 
juxtaposing case studies from France, Israel, and Sweden.  
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The French Constitutional Council and Deciding to Delegate 
 
“Institutions, in contrast to satellites, rarely stay in the orbit their creator intended.”
1
 
--Jean Rivero  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Attention to the so-called “third wave” of democratization in the second half of 
the twentieth century, cheering on the widespread acceptance of free elections as a 
prerequisite for regime legitimacy, obscured a parallel phenomenon unfolding in already 
established democratic regimes: the encroachment of judicial review upon erstwhile 
sovereign parliaments and presidencies. Through the constitutionalization of rights, and 
the proliferation of courts capable of enforcing them, the judiciary increasingly both 
shapes and constrains the policy preferences of elected politicians in developed 
democracies. The question is a classic one, underlying all institutional change: Why do 
“rational” politicians willingly surrender power to constitutional courts? What interest do 
political elites have in creating independent policy-making institutions…for the study of 
comparative judicial politics has established nothing if not a consensus among political 
scientists and legal scholars that courts are policy-making bodies…capable of thwarting 
majoritarian processes?  The question is also an important one as the evidence mounts 
against narrow conceptions of “rationality,” or political self-interest. Shapiro (1980) 
observed in his classic comparative work on courts that politicians “almost never 
                                                 
1 Jean Rivero, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et le Conseil d’État (Paris: L.G.D.J. Montchrestien, 1988), 158. 




 In a more recent work on the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), Conant (2002) remarks that “no political institution graciously cedes authority to 
another.”
3
 Yet the flag of judicial review advances in a variety of settings, defying such 
intuitions. This advance appears at present to be inexorable. I am aware of no case where 
judicial review, once implanted, has been retracted, unless the host democratic regime 
itself was suppressed.
4
 While much ink has been spilled over the rise of the European 
Court of Justice and its transnational judicial regime, surprisingly little interest had been 
paid to the origins of judicial review within countries until recently. Only in the past few 
years have book-length studies of the origins of judicial review begun to emerge.
5
 This 
study aspires to help close this persistent deficit in comparative judicial studies. 
For reasons I shall elaborate later, the French 5
th
 Republic presents perhaps the 
most curious cases of judicialization in modern times. The French Conseil 
Constitutionnel, or Constitutional Council, evolved in the span of five years from the 
meek institutional handmaiden of a Gaullist President into a controversial and 
independent judiciary empowered to veto or substantially alter government legislation. 
                                                 
2 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 17. 
3 Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002). 
4 For a broad look at the phenomenon of judicialization and its various definitions, see Torjborn Vallinder, 
“When the Courts Go Marching In,” in C. Neal Tate and Torjborn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of 
Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995). I adopt only half of Vallinder’s two-part 
definition: Judicialization is “the expansion of the province of the courts or judges at the expense of the 
politicians and/or the administrators, that is, the transfer of decision-making rights from the legislature, the 
cabinet, or the civil service to the courts…” Torjborn Vallinder, “The Judicialization of Politics—A World-
Wide Phenomenon: Introduction,” 15 International Political Science Review 2 (1994), 91. 
5 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequence of 
the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) 
 3 
Although occasionally decried as an imperial judiciary by disgruntled legislators on both 
the right and left  end of the political spectrum, the Council managed to survive what 
some political analysts have compared to a “constitutional crisis” in the early 1980s, 
recalling that which faced the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1930s.
6
 Indeed, the Council has 
prospered and is now an uncontested feature of the French political landscape. The 
popularity, and more important, legitimacy, of the Constitutional Council today, among 
politician’s as well as everyday citizens, is a fait accompli. 
 My research, focusing on the amendment of the French Constitution in 1974 to 
implement authentic judicial review,
7
 identifies its origins in the convergence of elite 
values and a struggle to consolidate the institutional structure of France’s 5
th
 Republic in 
a form acceptable to the Left and the Center-Right. In contrast to existing theories 
focused on “hegemonic preservation,”
8
 majority calculations of future electoral 
                                                 
6 Leo Hamon, Les Juges de la loi: naissance et rôle d’un contre-pouvoir, le Conseil Constitutionnel (Paris: 
Fayard, 1987); F. L. Morton, “Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis,” 36 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 89 (1988).  
7 Certain scholars insist on making a technical distinction between “judicial” and “constitutional” review. 
The former, characterizing the American model of review, is distinguished by a courts ability to overturn 
legislation after it has been promulgated, i.e. formally enacted and put into effect. The latter, characterizing 
the French mode of review, involves the invalidation of legislation before it is formally enacted and in 
effect. Such systems of review may be further distinguished by the absence of “concrete” review or the 
right of ordinary citizens to trigger review. The truly fastidious contest the propriety of calling bodies using 
this mode of review “courts” and argue that they are in fact councils, organs, or even “third chambers” of 
the legislature. See Rohr (1995) and Stone (1992). The distinction is plausible, but for purposes of the 
question posed here, irrelevant. In either case the substantive outcome is the same. Unelected and 
independent individuals are charged with interpreting the law and neither the legislative nor the executive 
branches may override their judgments. The dynamics may be different but the impact on policy-making is 
the same.  
8 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequence of the New Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment 





 interest group mobilization,
10
 and a variety of functional and legalistic 
approaches,
11
 I argue that basic constitutional and institutional values, at the core of 
which were competing conceptions of presidentialism and judicial power, drove the 
debates over judicial review. These values transcended narrow partisan divisions, though 
the debates themselves inevitably accrued the trappings of partisan skirmishing. More 
controversially, I argue that the 1974 debates over judicial review in France demonstrate 
a remarkable transformation of fundamental political values among France’s political 
elite, but most strikingly among the cadres of the Left. I further suggest that the 1974 
debates mark a pivotal moment in an ongoing process of elite convergence, of which the 
Constitutional Council was both a catalyst and a symptom. A running debate among 
Council scholars asks whether the Council’s enhanced role in the legislative process 
served to legitimate
12
 or antagonize French politics.
13
 My conclusion here favors the 
former rather than the latter proposition. 
 
                                                 
9 J. Mark Ramseyer, “The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach,” 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies 721 (1994); William Landes and Richard A. Posner, “The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective,” 18 Journal of Law and Economics 875 (1975). 
10 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other 
Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter 
and Walter Mattli, Constructing the European Legal System from the Ground Up: The Role of Individual 
Litigants and National Courts (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1996); Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and 
the Making of a Transnational Constitution,” 75 American Journal of International Law (1981). 
11 Barry Weingast, “Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure 
Markets,” 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 286 (1993). 
12 Louis Favoreu, “Le Conseil Constitutionnel et l’alternance,” 34 Revue française de science politique 
1002 (1984); F.L. Morton, “Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis,” 36 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 89 (1988). 
13 J.T.S. Keeler,  "Judicial-Political Confrontation in Mitterrand's France:  The Emergence of the 
Constitutional Council as a Major Actor in the Policy-Making Process"  in G. Ross, S. Hoffmann, and S. 
Malzacher, eds., The Mitterrand Experiment  (New York:  Oxford University Press; Oxford:  Polity Press, 
1987); Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France (New York: Oxford University France, 1992). 
 5 
2. Selection of Cases 
The conditions and countries giving rise to judicial review are diverse. Two broad 
categories, however, can be distinguished, and it is important that we do so. In the first 
category are countries where judicial review is established in tandem with the transition 
to democracy. This category includes cases such as Germany and Japan where 
independent judiciaries were imposed by an occupying power(s); Eastern Europe, in 
which constitutional courts were intended to bolster simultaneous economic and 
democratic transformations, and South Africa with its democratic transition from the 
system of apartheid in 1994. These cases have one important feature in common. Judicial 
review was introduced as one part of a massive constitutional overhaul during which 
practically all institutions were “on the table” and the negotiation of institutional forms 
was unusually fluid. In such contexts, courts are (a) regarded as a cornerstone of 
separation of powers and individual liberties conspicuously absent in the prior regime, 
and/or (b) established somewhat formulaically and without much debate, usually upon 
the American or German model. Judicial review holds extraordinary and obvious appeal, 
understandably, for political actors in countries falling into this category. For the question 
I am posing, such states are less puzzling: motivations are more compelling, institutions 
are more fluid, and persuasive templates are readily available.
14
 When considering states 
undergoing democratic transitions, existing theories are more likely to be adequate to the 
task of explaining the adoption of judicial review, a point I shall return to in Chapter 6. 
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 It is the second category, of which France is compelling member, which is more 
interesting because it is arguably more puzzling. This category comprises countries that 
are democratic and stable, yet subsequently introduce or drastically enhance the 
mechanisms of judicial review.  France (1974), Sweden (1974), Austria (1975), Canada 
(1982), New Zealand (1990), and Israel (1992) are members of this group. The 
introduction or extension of judicial review in these countries, absent the fertile chaos of 
regime change, puts the question raised above into greater relief: what motivates 
politicians to do so? In none of these countries did political elites introduce judicial 
review under emergency conditions or as part of a comprehensive constitutional revision. 
In these countries, politicians were ostensibly under less pressure and had more time to 
calculate the costs and benefits of judicial review. Executives, legislators and 
bureaucratic elites could reflect deliberately and with focus on the potentially adverse 
impact judicialization might have on the state’s existing institutions, and more important, 
their own prestige and relative influence within the policy process; in short, all those 
factors that gave them power. Viewed from this perspective the rise of judicial review is 




3. Origins of Judicial Review: Existing Explanations 
 Existing scholarship on judicial review yields a variety of divergent, if sometimes 
tentative, conclusions concerning its origins. The relevant literature is dwarfed by its 
counterpart in the area of democratization (with its focus on elections), and consequently 
much less robust. With many scholars focusing on background conditions and broad, 
descriptive comparisons, much of the literature may be characterized as quasi-
theoretical.
15
 Distinct causal explanations are often conflated in order to capture the 
richness of the historical record. Nevertheless, several plausible theories have emerged as 
the field of comparative judicial politics begins to assume its rightful seat at the table of 
comparative political studies. 
a. Theories of Judicial Empowerment 
 Several theories, some more empirically grounded than others, purport to explain 
why politicians do, in fact, willingly surrender power to constitutional courts. They may 
be classified into several broad categories: constitutionalism/normative explanations, 
interest group mobilization, auto-gestation, functionalism/utilitarianism, electoral 
markets, bureaucratic monitoring, credible commitments, and hegemonic preservation. 
These various explanations can be further categorized by whether they view the rise of 
judicial review as primarily endogenous or exogenous. Are the roots of judicial review 
primarily domestic or international? While some scholars, such as Landes & Posner 
(1975) and Ramseyer (1994), adopt a more reductionist (and thus more theoretically 
                                                 
15 The collected essays in Tate and Vallinder, eds., (1995), supra, are a classic example. 
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elegant) explanation of judicial empowerment, others (Weiler 1999) tend to merge two or 
more hypotheses to capture the complexity of particular cases. 
b. The Culture of Constitutionalism 
             To some, judicialization appears as the logical, even inevitable, outcome of 
democratization.
16
 The safeguarding of individual and minority rights is widely 
recognized as a cornerstone of viable democracies. Even those most concerned with 
electoral arrangements in the study of democratization acknowledge that a strong 
foundation of liberalism (freedom of speech, association, the press, etc.) must accompany 
routine and frequent elections.
17
 Democratic regimes therefore call courts into service to 
guard against the “tyranny of the majority” and to guarantee that electoral competitions 
are not deprived of their substance. Constitutional courts exist to “shelter the fundamental 
rights of citizens”
18
 though this principle necessarily exists in tension with the democratic 
principle of majoritarianism. Crudely put, global judicialization is the Madisonian precept 
of limited government writ large. Though Madison himself, at pains to address the 
dilemma of majoritarian excess in a representative government, never turned to the 
judiciary as a solution, the development of American government ultimately thrust the 
federal courts into this role. For some, the global expansion of judicial review is yet 
another example of the “Americanization” of foreign political institutions. 
 Of course, constitutional theorists, from Locke to Rousseau to Nozick, have long 
conceptualized constitutional arrangements as a “contract,” not only between citizens 
                                                 
16 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990). 
17 Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). 
18 Vallinder, supra, n.4.  
 9 
themselves, but between citizens and their government. Contractarian theories often 
invoke the principal-agent metaphor with “the people” in the role of principal and 
politicians playing the role of agents. Constitutions serve to circumscribe the autonomy 
of the people’s agents. Judicial review is one institution which can prevent politicians 
from violating the people’s contract, with courts policing politicians. The objections to 
contractarian theory as an empirical explanation of constitutional bargains, however, are 
well-known. Constitutions rarely, if ever, emerge as a result of massive popular 
participation. Consequently, the notion that constitutions directly reflect the “will of the 
people” is highly suspect. Politicians are not simply “agents” of the people and bring 
their own interests to the table when designing constitutions. A substantial body of 
literature, not to mention a review of the founding of the American republic, 
demonstrates that political elites embed their own narrow interests into the constitutional 
structures they themselves are responsible for negotiating.
19
 Judges are quite often 
appointed by the very politicians they are charged with monitoring. Thus while judges are 
idealized as being objective observers somehow “outside” the constitutional arrangement, 
they are themselves part of the political elite. A glance at the controversy over “judicial 
activism” in the United States is enough to raise serious doubts about the umpire function 
supposedly provided by judges. Contractarian theories of judicial review tend to yield 
normative rather than empirical insights into the rise of judicial review. 
                                                 
19 Stefan Voigt, “Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey,” 90 Public Choice 11 (1997); Dennis 
Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); John Elster, “Forces and 
Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” 45 Duke Law Journal 364 (1995). 
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 Putting aside the normative problems of the “countermajoritarian difficulty,”
20
 an 
empirical puzzle persists: Why the proliferation of constitutional courts when so many 
long-enduring democracies have prospered without them? To unravel the puzzle, legal 
academics have traditionally posited a paradigm shift following World War II. Many 
attribute the post-war enthusiasm for judicial review to (a) a backlash against the rampant 
abuse of civil liberties by totalitarian regimes during the 1930s and 1940s, (b) the failure 
of democratic elections to prevent the rise of such regimes, and (c) the subsequent 
prestige of American-style judicial review, backed by the influence of American 
occupation on judicial institution-building in countries such as Germany, Italy and 
Japan.
21
 In the standard account, the post-war responses of states to their own political 
dysfunctions of the 1930s are encouraged and reinforced by the process of European 
integration and the meteoric rise of the European Court of Justice and European Court of 
Human Rights. Transnational norms of judicial review thus come to complement or 
supplant national experience as the driving force behind judicialization. As the twin 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and ECHR casts its constitutional net over Europe and requires 
domestic implementation, the institution of judicial review has evolved from comme il 
                                                 
20 Robert Dahl, “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker,” 6 
Journal of Public Law 279 (1957); Richard Funston, “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” 69 
American Political Science Review 795 (1975). 
21 The extent to which American judicial norms influenced the development of post-war West European 
judiciaries is a contested issue. Clearly, the influence and appeal of American institutional design was a 
factor, but for a perspective accenting the endogenous origins of the German and Italian constitutional 
courts, see, among others, John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino’s paper “Constitutional Adjudication: 
Lessons from Europe”, presented at UT School of Law’s conference “Comparative Avenues in 
Constitutional Law”, February 27-28, 2004. 
 11 
faut to de rigueur.
22
 This movement assumed a truly global dimension with the U.N.’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the growing legitimacy of International 
Criminal Courts for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In short, 
global integration has homogenized national norms vis-à-vis judicial review in favor of 
strong review. 
A related factor is the revival of natural law theories following World War II. The 
above-mentioned failure of positive law to protect individual liberties during the inter-
war years ushered in a more sympathetic environment to philosophies of law amenable to 
judicial activism. The revived prestige of traditional natural law theorists such as Kant, 
Locke and Rousseau has been accompanied by the development of contemporary rights-
based theories exemplified by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
23




While contractarian theories are empirically deficient, explanations of judicial 
review’s origins in a post-war, transnational diffusion of norms acquire traction, 
particularly in the European context. National acquiescence to a host of international 
legal regimes constraining national prerogatives, particularly those embodied in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union, represent a sea change 
in elite and popular attitudes toward judicial independence. But the Euro-centric nature of 
norm-based explanations leaves several questions unanswered. Why have some European 
states institutionalized domestic judicial review while others have not? What explains the 
                                                 
22 The self-declared ECJ doctrines such as  “Direct Effect” and “Supremacy” have effectively subordinated 
national courts to pan-European judicial surveillance. 
23 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
24 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
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timing of judicial review in those countries that have? How did domestic politics impact 
the reception of evolving international norms favoring judicial review? Finally, did these 
evolving norms somehow overwhelm or dovetail with the self-interest of affected elites 
where judicial review did in fact take root? Generalizations about a “rights revolution” in 
Europe and beyond raise more questions than they answer. 
c. Interest Group Mobilization 
              The rise of a transnational legal regime holding together the European Union, 
specifically the impact of transnational judicial review in the form of ECJ and ECHR 
rulings, has produced attempts to explain the ebb of national sovereignty in a way that 
minimizes the influence of elected national elites. According to these accounts, a web of 
individuals spread across national boundaries constitute “consumers” of judicial review 












 and Weiler 1999).
30
 The societal actors in these accounts are almost exclusively 
legal or quasi-legal; judges, lawyers and bureaucrats who have a personal or institutional 
stake in enhanced judicial power. Such accounts illuminate why national courts have, 
over time, been receptive to the ECJ’s expanding authority as a trans-European supreme 
                                                 
25 Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of 
Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
26 Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002). 
27 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
28 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and J. H. H. Weiler, eds., The European Court and National 
Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence—Legal Change in its Social Context (Oxford: Hart Publishers, 1999). 
29 Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution,” 75 American Journal of 
International Law (1981). 
30 Weiler, supra, n. 10. 
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court. In one variant, judges themselves play a dominant role in championing judicial 
supremacy. Weiler (1999) offers a “judicial empowerment” thesis crediting the ECJ’s 
burgeoning activism to concerted action by judges of the ECJ and national judiciaries. At 
first blush, the judges in national courts might seem hostile to the ECJ, viewing it as an 
institutional competitor. Weiler, however, has persuasively demonstrated that submitting 
to the tutelage of supranational institutions can enhance the competence of national courts 
vis-à-vis other national institutions, providing them with an expanded doctrinal arsenal 
and enhancing their authority relative to other state institutions.
31
 Those familiar with the 
Warren Court’s jurisprudence and the landmark decision of Justice Marshall in Marbury 
v. Madison
32
 will be familiar with claims that judges, though possessing neither the purse 
nor the sword, can dramatically extend judicial power on their own initiative. Such 
claims advance what I call a “heroic” or “auto-gestation” theory of judicial 
empowerment. These claims appear plausible as judges frequently attempt to expand the 
influence of their office and rarely shy away from the tool of judicial review when it is on 
offer. In the case of the 1974 amendment extending judicial review in France, the sitting 
President of the Constitutional Council, as well as his two predecessors, came out 
strongly in favor of it.
33
 Some evidence suggests that the proposed amendment itself may 
have been the brainchild of the Constitutional Council’s President.
34
   
                                                 
31 Weiler , ibid. 
32 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
33 Joel Boudant, “Le President du Conseil Constitutionnel” in Revue du droit public, 3 Mai-Juin (1987). 
34 Although officially sponsored by the President of the Republic, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Roger Frey, 
the President of the Constitutional Council, was most likely the true author of the reform. Frey’s two 
predecessors as President of the Constitutional Council disagreed on the full version of the 1974 
amendment, opposing  the government’s text that would have allowed the Council to convoke itself (this 
 14 
Given the flexibility inherent in the interpretation of texts, it comes as no surprise that 
judiciaries are prone to institutional mission creep, a fact born out by case study after case 
study. Judicial review, in particular, however, marks a sea change in the balance of 
political power among institutions. We should credit this modified “interest-group” based 
approach with capturing the demand-side of judicial empowerment. But this approach 
can accurately reflect only half of the story. We must ascribe at least as much importance 
to the supply-side of judicial politics. Why do elected national elites—legislative and 
executive; those with the ultimate power to weaken their own institutional capacities—
accede to the agenda of these interest groups, especially on occasions when such groups 
lack any significant electoral base or direct support in public opinion? The cases of the 
ECJ, the ECHR, and their peculiar legal regimes are special.  While an interest-group 
approach has been successful in illuminating the rise of transnational judicial review in 
Europe, it does not travel easily to national settings, particularly in France where elected 
officials were key decision-makers and elite hostility to judicial review appeared well-
entrenched. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
portion of the amendment was rejected by Parliament). Both, however, endorsed the core innovation of the 
amendment allowing the Council to exercise judicial review over legislation upon the request of 60 
members of parliament. 
 15 
d. Utilitarian Explanations of Judicial Review 
             Utilitarian theories offer a needs-based explanation of judicial review. Cappelletti 
(1980) locates the global trend of judicial activism in this century’s increasing 
socioeconomic complexity and the rise of the modern welfare state.
35
 The diversity and 
intricacy of modern industrial (or post-industrial) societies brings an exponential rise in 
demands upon the state and increases the frequency of conflicts requiring mediation. 
Such demands presumably overwhelm the capacity of already stretched legislative 
resources. Courts emerge as critical first-responders capable of supporting over-worked 
elected officials. From this perspective, judicial review seems to acquire an evolutionary 
inevitability in advanced societies. 
 One interesting variant of this approach is the “ungovernability” thesis.
36
 When 
political issues are sufficiently polarized to make compromise too difficult…or too 
expensive…for legislatures to broker, legislatures may only be too happy to pass 
authority to judicial officers with no electoral accountability. Enshrining constitutional 
rights in written form and placing them under the surveillance of judicial guardians 
transcends political impasse in “deeply divided societies.” Courts can provide third-party 
dispute resolution where “ordinary” politics breaks down. Graber (1993) is a prominent 
                                                 
35 “…I should say that historical pressures are uni-vocal in calling for judicial activism in modern systems 
of government. This holds true beyond the borders of Europe—and beyond the borders of judicial review 
itself…the rise of the modern “welfare” government and the parallel increase of socioeconomic 
interdependence of groups, categories, and classes of citizens demand a corresponding strengthening and 
growth of the function of “judicial protection” against the awesome power of both “big government” and 
groups or organizations. In particular, judicial review of legislative action has become an essential element 
of the the modern Rechstaat or “rule of law.” See Mauro Cappelletti, “The Mighty Problem of Judicial 
Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis,” 53 Southern California Law Review 409 (1980). 
36 Hirschl, supra, n.5. 
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exponent of this approach in his examination of the relationship between the United 
States Congress and the Supreme Court. In essence, legislators, too inflexible to 
compromise or too pusillanimous to do so in the teeth of a culturally/ideologically 
polarized public, will punt uncomfortable issues to judicial institutions. As with all 
functionalist accounts of change, the ungovernability thesis assumes the inevitability of 
institutional change. It cannot always illuminate why particular institutional forms are 
preferable to others or credibly account for the timing of institutional change. Nor does it 
specify when a society becomes “ungovernable.” What constitutes a “deeply divided 
society” requiring judicial arbitration? Does France in 1974 count? Sweden in 1974? 
What about Israel in the 1990s? As important, functional accounts exclude the role of 
agency, the importance of the innovators themselves who have their own political 
preferences and constraints within which they must operate. 
e. “New Institutionalist” Theories/Rational Choice 
           We may divide institutionalist explanations of judicial empowerment into three 
distinct arguments: the “Fire Alarm” Mechanism,” “Credible Commitments,” and 
“Competitive Electoral Markets.” The first variant suggests that judicial review operates 
as a “fire alarm” mechanism for monitoring bureaucracy.
37
 Allowing individuals who feel 
they have been wronged by government agencies to sue in the judicial system is less 
costly for the executive and legislative branches than its alternative, the “police patrol” 
mechanism. It is not evident, however, why a fire alarm mechanism would need to take 
                                                 
37 Roderick D. Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubins, The Logic of Delegation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
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the form of a constitutional court. Regimes lacking constitutional courts (and judicial 
review) often boast distinguished administrative courts generally acknowledged to have 
performed well in protecting citizens from the abuse of executive power. The empirical 
record is also unclear on whether regimes with constitutional courts have outperformed 
those without them in pushing the frontiers of “civil liberty.” To take a contemporary 
example, the right to legal equality for same-sex unions has not fared demonstrably better 
in countries with a strong tradition of judicial review than those without them. Among 
existing countries where same-sex unions are legal, the majority are the result of 
parliamentary rather than judicial initiative. The bureaucratic monitoring rationale, 
moreover, is redundant in the case of France where the supreme administrative tribunal, 
the Conseil d’État has had a long and celebrated record in protecting citizens against 
administrative abuse. Indeed, the Council of State has long served as a model and 
inspiration for other judicial regimes. Deeper political or ideological motivations must 
underpin the French decision to create a court capable of vetoing legislative initiatives 
originating from the executive or legislative branch. 
Another variant proposes that judicial review represents a solution to the “credible 
commitments” problem.
38
  Particularly relevant to democratizing states, the creation of an 
independent judiciary capable of monitoring the executive and legislative branches’ 
compliance with basic rules of the game bestows a political regime with enhanced 
credibility in the eyes of political or economic “investors.” Under the assumption that 
                                                 
38 Barry Weingast, “Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure 
Markets,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 (1993), 286-311; Oliver Williamson, 
“Credible Commitment: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,” 73 American Economic Review 4 (1983). 
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legislation is the product of interest group competition, legislatures may find it in their 
own interest to bolster judicial independence. This assures investors that subsequent 
legislatures will not find it easy to rollback legislative concessions made by prior 
legislatures.
39
 The credible commitments approach also diminishes the crucial role played 
by key political office-holders and is generally assumed to be driven by economic 
interests. As we will see, it does not map well onto the French experience in 1974. 
             Perhaps the most compelling and easily applied domestic-based explanation of 
judicial empowerment is the “competitive electoral market” thesis. Privileging a more 
traditionally “political” analysis and building on Landes and Posner’s (1975) game theory 
exploration of judicial independence, Ramseyer (1994) argues that rational politicians 
will keep courts independent under a restrictive set of circumstances: “Fundamentally, 
whether they keep them (courts) independent…depends on two things: (a) whether they 
expect elections to continue indefinitely, and (b) if elections continue, whether they 
expect to continue to win them indefinitely.”
40
 Politicians will grant courts independence 
only when they are somewhat confident that elections will continue and they expect to 
lose elections. In this way they may safeguard their own policy preferences while 
simultaneously blocking a victorious opposition from using the courts to advance its own 
policy objectives. The electoral market thesis, however, frames itself in narrowly partisan 
terms. This partisan-based approach may oversimplify to a fault, neglecting the role of 
judicial and bureaucratic actors and missing the complexity of cross-cutting cleavages in 
                                                 
39 William M. Landes and Richard Posner, “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,” 
18 Journal of Law & Economics 875 (1975). 
40 Mark Ramseyer, “The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach,” 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies 721, 722. 
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multiparty systems. It also presents empirical problems in determining the intentions of 
political actors. Finally, the long-term/short term dilemma inherent in creating 
constitutional courts complicates Ramseyer’s conditions. While court members are 
typically political appointees of the government in power, the length of terms judges 
serve and their jurisdictional opportunities for intervention in the policy process vary 
widely. How does an elected official determine whether short-term gains will be worth 
the long-term costs of judicial independence?  Still, Ramseyer provides a credible theory 
of judicial independence that can be tested against the decision of the French Parliament 
to approve the 1974 constitutional amendment authorizing strengthened judicial review. 
e. Hegemonic Preservation 
Hirschl (2004, 2001) elaborates upon Ramseyer’s election-driven approach by 
spotlighting the role of political elites in culturally divided societies. Although he 
presents his “hegemonic preservation” thesis as a departure from the electoral market 
perspective, it is arguable how far Hirschl moves from the latter’s basic assumptions 
since the prospect of impending electoral defeat plays a pivotal role in his work as well. 
Hirschl locates the origins of constitutional reform (specifically, judicial review) in “a 
conscious strategy undertaken by threatened elites seeking to preserve their hegemony 
vis-à-vis the growing interest of peripheral interest groups in majoritarian policymaking 
arenas”.
41
 Hegemonic preservation promises a richer and more nuanced account of 
judicial review’s origins. It admits a greater role for the cultural and ideological values 
                                                 
41 Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons 
from Israel’s Constitutional Revolution,” 33 Comparative Politics 3 (2001), 319. 
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held by political elites in addition to those elites’ short-term electoral interests. For a 
while, Hirschl’s case studies raised questions about how well his thesis travels beyond the 
Middle East. This is largely an empirical question awaiting testing, though his latest work 
extends his analysis to several non-Middle Eastern countries. It is problematic that the 
cases Hirschl considers closely are: (a) in the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Turkey), (b) 
cases where the cultural fault-lines dividing hegemonic elites from their opponents are 
primarily religious or ethnic in nature
42
, and (c) include two cases where the extent of 
judicial independence is suspect due to authoritarian pressures. Still, there is no reason 
why the basic premise of hegemonic preservation—that elites in a position of declining 
strength use the judiciary to fight a rearguard action in defense of their policy preferences 
and values—would not be applicable to countries lacking explosive secular-religious 
fissures. I thus seek to apply the theory to longstanding democracies such as Canada, 






                                                 
42 See Ran Hirschl, “Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales”, 
paper presented at the University of Texas School of Law conference, “Comparative Avenues in 
Constitutional Law”, February 27-28, 2004. Hirschl notes that while secular elites initiated Israel’s 
constitutional revolution in 1992, it was supported by industrial and professional elites who have pursued 
their own neo-liberal agenda through litigation. The most polarizing conflict confronting the Israeli 
Supreme Court, however, remains the inherently challenging task of reconciling the Constitution’s twin 
directives requiring a state that is simultaneously Jewish and democratic. 
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Table: Theories of Judicial Review 
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4. Research Methodology and Preview of the Argument 
The project is a focused case study of France’s adoption of effective judicial 
review. This case study is supplemented with a multi-case analysis of several other 
countries (pre-existing democracies) that have adopted judicial review relatively recently. 
The chapters that follow draw primarily upon data collected during 10 months in Paris, 
France. During this time my research focused on a careful examination of (a) the official 
transcripts of the parliamentary debates and constitutional convention leading to the 
passage of Giscard’s 1974 amendment, (b) newspaper coverage of and political editorials 
on the subject of the constitutional reform, and (c) official political party documents and 
policy statements, particularly those of the French Left, articulating elite positions on the 
Constitutional Council and, more specifically, the role of judicial review in the French 
political system. Of particular value in obtaining these data were the Bibliothèque 
Administrative of Paris, the Archives du Socialisme, the CUJAS, and the Bibliothèque 
d’Information Publique. I was fortunate enough to interview the distinguished François 
Luchaire, a former member of the Constitutional Council and an outside participant in the 
debates of 1974. His intimate interaction with several of the key political actors in the 
October debates, as well as view of the legislature from the perspective of a Council 
member, made him a valuable resource. While I had hoped to interview directly several 
of the key participants in the legislative debates, the unfortunate problem of mortality 
proved a formidable obstacle. Of forty-two legislators on record as having actively 
participated in the debates, only twelve survived and most of these had retired outside of 
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Paris. Where interviews were not possible, I attempted to substitute correspondence. 
What follows is a preview of some of the key arguments, specific to the French case, 
advanced in the chapters that follow. As my research draws almost exclusively on French 
sources, the following pages contain a considerable number of quotations. All quotations, 
unless otherwise noted, are my own. 
a. An Intra-Elite Affair. 
The most obvious conclusion to draw from the 1974 debates in France over 
judicial review and the landmark amendment they produced is that they were an 
exclusively elite-driven phenomenon. The President of the Republic formally announced 
the project of reform. The evidence points to a member of the Constitutional Council and 
veritable “Baron of Gaullism,” Roger Frey, as the possible inspiration and probable co-
author of the reform. The debates themselves attracted little interest from the public, a 
fact that the opposition ruthlessly exploited at every turn in the debates
43
 and that worried 
not a few of those sympathetic to the Government’s project. Following a stream of 
accusations from the Left branding the Government’s reform as a “constitutional 
diversion” and a “mini-reform”, the well-respected independent and legal specialist 
Pierre Marcilhacy warned: “In having the appearance of turning attention towards a 
constitutional reform that interests no one, not even specialists like myself, you lose a 
little of your time and energy”.
44
 Politicians faced neither pressure from their districts nor 
                                                 
43 “Why undertake such an adventure to which it is easy to understand the entire country is indifferent?” 
Edgar Tailhades, JORF, Sénat Débats, Oct. 16, p. 1332. 
44 JORF, Sénat Débats, Oct. 16, p. 1324. 
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determined lobbies, an important distinction in cases from some other countries.
45
 Many 
feared rather that the mounting social and economic crisis in France at the time would 
leave them vulnerable to the accusation that they had fiddled with constitutional parlor 
games while France’s economy burned.  
A strong signal of public apathy was Giscard’s decision not to bypass the 
exclusively parliamentary amendment procedure—which required 3/5 of both chambers 
meeting together to agree upon the text of the amendment in identical terms—and to 
submit his proposal to a popular referendum. Approval by referendum would have only 
required a simple majority of Parliament and a simple majority of the public voting in the 
referendum. Yet the Government was apparently reluctant to “go public” with its reform, 
a point mocked by Henri Caillavet during the debates when he contended that the limited 
nature of the reform pitted the “legal country” versus the “real country”.
46
 At the same 
time as he was affirming to the press the interest that every Frenchman should have in the 
outcome of the reform, even then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac conceded that it (the 
reform) “might appear a bit too technical to interest public opinion”.
47
  In the absence of 
a truly “public” debate, however, a lively exchange of opinions and quite specific 
critiques of the proposed reforms thrived outside of Parliament in the columns of the 
most prestigious newspapers, notably in Le Monde and La Libération. Here legislators, 
ex-politicians, and academics, loosed from the constraints of party discipline or 
                                                 
45 The absence of a significant industrial or commercial “lobby” on this issue distinguishes the French case 
from Israel’s much-studied constitutional revolution of the 1990s. 
46 “If you couldn’t get a Majority in Parliament, would you put it to referendum?” Henri Caillavet, JORF, 
Sénat Débats, Oct. 16, p. 1320.  
47 Le Monde, 20-21 October, 1974, p. 7. 
 25 
parliamentary procedure, carried on an intra-elite dialogue that often prepared the ground 
for subsequent parliamentary sessions. On several occasions during the floor debates, in 
both the National Assembly and the Senate, an orator would rise to quote the morning’s 
editorial of this or that doyen or statesman in prominent national papers. While coverage 
in France’s flagship media may have offered the French public a window onto the debate 
over judicial review, the legislative deliberation and decision-making took place in what 
was almost as close to an elite vacuum as can be imagined. The arrival of judicial review 
in France was from the top-down. To this limited extent, the French case conforms to 
Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation” theory, which holds that elite preferences drive 
judicial empowerment, though the role of “interest groups,” broadly defined, was next to 
negligible. In short—and as my subsequent analysis of the debates will show—the origin 
of meaningful judicial review in France was not only an intra-elite affair, but an affair 
that attracted the impassioned interest of only a minority of that elite. 
b. Cultural Factors: Judicial Review as a “Home-Grown” Phenomenon 
 I have mentioned the widely held argument that judicial review proliferates as a 
result of the diffusion of international norms, the growth of international institutions 
(such as the EU), a reaction to prior histories of authoritarianism and an “example effect”. 
Certainly, a profound social shift was taking place in post-1968 France, as it was in many 
other countries. Social liberalism and a culture of rights-talk appeared increasingly 
ascendant in French political discourse, a trend to which French President Giscard 
d’Estaing was well-attuned. This cultural transformation was to great degree an 
international phenomenon, with political elites mediating its impact on policy. The 
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introduction of judicial review to more effectively safeguard individual and minority 
rights is consistent with a variety of liberal reforms (abortion, contraception, death 
penalty, prison reform) introduced in France and other European countries during the late 
1960s and 1970s.  
It was not, however, a direct result of this liberalization. Many countries in 
Europe experienced the same cultural shift without implementing judicial review. 
Moreover, while specific liberal causes had their domestic constituencies and pressure 
groups in France, judicial review was not one of them.
48
 As noted above, there was no 
popular movement for constitutional reform. 
 The influence of the European integration, particularly the examples provided by 
its two celebrated judicial bodies, the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), strangely enough, seems to have left no footprint on the 1974 
debates. The lone voice invoking their relevance was that of François Luchaire, former 
member of the Constitutional Council, who suggested that the reform amend the 
Constitution to explicitly guarantee individual rights under the Constitution and 
international treaties. Luchaire went even further, suggesting that the European 
Convention of the Rights of Man be codified in the Constitution.
49
 No parliamentary 
group introduced such amendments. 
Of course, the debates over judicial review did not take place without awareness 
of the world outside France or alternative models of judicial review. Parliamentarians 
                                                 
48 Many within the judiciary and the legal academy had, of course, been enthusiasts of expanded judicial 
oversight of the state. Their influence was felt primarily, however, in the circulation of legally trained and 
conditioned individuals in and out of the state administration and the political class. 
49 “Les Ambiguïtés de la reforme constitutionnelle” in Le Monde, Oct. 8, 1974, p. 9. 
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frequently invoked comparative examples, but generally for the purpose of advocating or 
criticizing particular modalities of, not the legitimacy of, judicial review. The debates do 
betray a sense among several of the participants that France was somehow lagging behind 
the rest of the industrial democracies in the stability and quality of its liberal institutions, 
and that it needed to “catch up”. This is perhaps most explicit in Chirac’s opening speech 
to both assemblies gathered in the Congrés du Parlement. In that address, he urged them 
to support the government’s reform (now whittled down to a single proposal) in the name 
of “modernization,” emphasizing that stronger institutional safeguards for liberty are 
appropriate to the “dignity of a great country”.
50
 The American and German high courts 
were the most frequent examples deployed. Yet even among those committed to a more 
authentic presidential system, i.e. those desiring to specifically extend constitutional 
surveillance to the presidency as well as parliament, the American example, in particular, 
provoked a marked ambivalence. Even Pierre Marcilhacy, presidentialism’s grand 
champion in the Parliament and a figure respected on both sides of the aisle, doubted the 
receptivity of French political culture to a true system of judicial review. As he wistfully 
conceded during the Senate debates, “Above the religion of Constitutionalism is the idea 
that the nation does as it will”.
51
 The desire to stay true to French political tradition and 
not go wandering too far abroad permeated the rhetoric of the Right. On this point, the 
government and the leadership of the UDR strove to maintain a difficult balancing act. 
On the one hand, the presence of strong misgivings within the ranks of the 
                                                 
50 JORF, Congrés du Parlement, Oct. 21, 1974, p.4. 
51 Pierre Marcilhacy. JORF, Sénat Débats, Oct. 16, p. 1324.  
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UDR…especially among several particularly respected senior members
52
…required them 
to stress the limited nature of the reforms. In a tip of the hat to these orthodox members, 
Chirac stressed that the reform was “not a modification of Gaullist principles” but a 
confirmation of their spirit.
53
  On the other hand, they had to demonstrate that the reform 
was significant enough to move the entire Parliament to Versailles for an extraordinary 
session (at a moment when economic issues were pressing) to avoid confirming critics’ 
repeated claims that the reform was a sideshow. Clearly, this was not an easy task.
54
 
c. The French Case fits neither the “hegemonic preservation” thesis nor the “electoral 
markets” thesis from which it is derived. 
The French case poses several problems for the electoral markets theory, and its 
more recent variant, the hegemonic preservation thesis. One application of this approach 
to the French case, occasionally mentioned but not well-supported, is that the Center-
Right majority in 1974, spooked by the strong showing of the Left in the 1973 
presidential elections, were already thinking of possible “rear-guard” actions against the 
possibility of the Left’s future victory. A variation of this argument, again poorly 
supported, speculates that certain representatives on the Right sought a strengthened 
judiciary to protect the interests of property in the event that the Socialists might someday 
deliver on their promises to nationalize key sectors of the economy. According to this 
                                                 
52 A dozen of the most prominent UDR legislators, the so-called “barons of Gaullism,” conspicuously 
broke party discipline and refused to vote on the proposal. 
53 JORF, Congrés du Parlement, Oct. 21, 1974, p.3. 
54 The notion that the government had tied itself to the mast of a quite messy constitutional proposal in 
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perspective, the super-charged Constitutional Council that emerged from the 1974 




 Several obvious objections meet this interpretation of the events of October 1974. 
First, perhaps the strongest principled opposition to the 1974 reform came from inside the 
majority alliance itself. The Gaullist UDR included a deeply conservative nucleus—
contemptuously labeled the “Vestal Virgins” by one Socialist critic
56
—who resented any 
tinkering with de Gaulle’s constitutional handiwork. If any representatives of the majority 
harbored such motivations during the National Assembly or Senate debates, they did not 
make even oblique references to them over the course of the amendment process, with 
one exception. The only evidence of hegemonic “intent” is a somewhat vague exchange 
between an RI and Socialist delegate in the National Assembly and an unsupported (and 
again, vague) allegation in La Libération, the leading Socialist newspaper.   
Second, the Gaullists’ indispensable ally in parliament, the Independent 
Republicans (RI), viewed themselves as a rising party, not a receding party, and hoped to 
someday be a new majority at time of debate. Although the calculations of “rational 
actors” concerning future events are difficult to identify precisely, there is no reason to 
believe that the reform’s most enthusiastic supporters, the RI, with new elections years 
distant, clearly divined that a Socialist majority would shatter their blooming “majority of 
the center” over six years later. Six years is a long time, even in French politics. 
                                                 
55 Stone, supra, n. 13.  
56 Jean-Pierre Cot. JORF, Assemblée Nationale Débats (Oct. 8), p. 4861. 
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   Third, and critically, the Left did not oppose judicial review per se. In fact, a 
preponderance of evidence—in particular the Left’s platform as laid out in its Common 
Program—supports the finding that both the Socialists and the Communists were 
prepared to go much further in expanding judicial review than Center-Right Government 
itself. Official Socialist, but especially Communist, platforms and programs advocated a 
more aggressive overhaul of the Constitutional Council which, if adopted, would have 
guaranteed even greater judicial independence. Although the Left entered the debate with 
gusto and went on record to oppose the amendment, its representatives worked 
constructively in committee to favorably shape the terms of the proposal. 
Fourth, the constitutional reform of 1974 simply cannot be viewed outside the 
context of the Government’s (Giscard’s, in particular) raft of genuinely liberal reforms. 
(These reforms encompassed abortion rights, free speech, penal reforms, and lowering of 
the voting age, among other subjects). The work of both Madelin (1975) and Bothorel 
(1983) conclude that Giscard was attempting to enlarge his “presidential majority” 
toward the Left—an ironic fact in retrospect given that his majority really depended on 
the Right, the proposal itself originating with an arch-Gaullist.
57
 
d. The real controversy for a majority of the participants in October 1974 was not over 
whether there should be judicial review, but rather what form it should take.  
That question, in turn hinged on the balance of power between the executive the executive 
and legislative branches. As mentioned above, the political Left in France did not oppose 
                                                 
57 Henri Madelin, “Le Libéralisme de Giscard” (December 1975), pp. 1157-1170; Jean Bothorel, Histoire 
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the expansion of judicial review on its own terms, particularly as such a move could only 
bolster their oppositional resources in Parliament. Rather, the record demonstrates that 
the resistance of the Socialist and Communist leaderships to Giscard’s constitutional 
reform was that it was a “réformette” which failed to go far enough.
58
 Of course, the twin 
partisan objectives of (a) embarrassing the new President, and (b) denying the 
government credit for liberal reforms were key motives here. But there was more to it 
than this.  
The October debates over the Council’s future could not help but reflect an 
enduring tectonic debate over the nature of executive power under the 5
th
 Republic, 
dating back to 5
th
 Republic’s founding in 1958 and de Gaulle’s (arguably) 
unconstitutional expansion of executive power by referendum in 1962. This debate cut 
across party lines, as a majority of the Center-Right represented by Giscard’s 
Independent Republicans had vigorously opposed de Gaulle’s self-aggrandizing 
plebiscite along with parties of the Left. For these centrists, the 5
th
 Republic’s re-
constituted executive branch flirted with authoritarianism. To many the cure lay with the 
establishment of a “true” presidential regime in place of de Gaulle’s lopsided executive 
edifice. Parliament should be strengthened vis-à-vis the executive branch. Establishing a 
veritable supreme court was one obvious means of creating a regime where the 
government might be held accountable to Parliament, and not simply the other way 
around. The venerable Independent, Pierre Marcilhacy, articulated this pro-parliamentary 
position most explicitly. Marcilhacy ultimately voted against the constitutional reform, 
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after a passionate but nuanced declamation, because he felt it did not provide the 
prerequisites of an authentic presidential regime; a sufficiently independent supreme 
court and a vice president.
59
 
Previous work on French judicial politics has failed to credit the significance of 
institutional conflict in the 1974 debates over judicial review. Because the issue of 
judicial reform implicated Parliament’s institutional powers and identity, the debates in 
some part pitted Parliament against the Government, as well as Right against Left. This 
inter-institutional conflict can be tied to a more general attempt on the part of Parliament 
to assert itself vis-à-vis the government in the period from 1971 to 1975.
60
 The October 
debates essentially capped this period of a resurgent legislative branch. Indeed, the 1974 
debates marked the sole instance of majority discipline breaking down on an important 
government initiative, when a sufficient number of Gaullists and independents made it 
clear that the government would have to drop its proposed extension of a right of auto-




e. Auto-gestation: A necessary but insufficient condition. 
 As I have previously argued, there are many scholars, tellingly concentrated in 
legal academia, who adopt a “heroic” view of judges and their role in judicial 
empowerment. Indeed, there are at least two obvious cases that appear to support the 
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hypotheses that individual judges or a particular cluster of justices, through force of will 
and creative jurisprudence, transform the policy-making role of courts. One has only to 
think of the United States’ John Marshall, that Atlas of “judicial supremacy,” or the 
aggressive path an assertive ECJ cut for itself in the mid-1960s. This perspective is 
especially common among French in regard to the 1974 reform. For one, the 
government’s reform was inscribed “in the inherent logic of the evolution of 
jurisprudence”.
62
 For others it was the Constitutional Council itself that created the 
conditions of its own reform. Emerging from its over-cautious and inauspicious 
beginnings, it gradually developed jurisprudence, the bloc constitutionnel, which 
established the Council’s respectability.  The celebrated decision of July 16, 1971, in 
particular, showcasing the Council’s judicial creativity and, more important, 
independence from the government, ultimately convinced political elites that it was a 
legitimate—that is to say, independent—judicial body capable of wielding authentic 
powers of judicial review.
63
 Furthermore, legal academics had kept alive the case for 
expanding the Council’s power of judicial review in a number of articles (Philip, 
Eisenmann and Hamon 1961, Favoreu 1967) written during the 1960s. 
 But the apparent origin of such a reform lies with a politician and goes back to 
1958. M. Triboulet proposed an amendment to the new constitution during the 
deliberations of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, the body most responsible 
for shaping the constitutional contours of the 5
th
 Republic. It would have allowed the 
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President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of both the National 
Assembly and the Senate, and one-third of either chamber of parliament to refer 
legislation to the Council.
64
 The amendment did not survive the drafting process. The 
road to judicial review in France is strewn with the cadavers of reforms similar in scope 
and purpose to the one that finally succeeded in 1974…some nine such proposals 
managed to make it to floor debate in the National Assembly prior to that pivotal year.
65
 
So what made the year 1974 different?  
It is certain that the Council brightened its own star by winning wide respect for 
its jurisprudence in the three years preceding its new grant of power. By contrast, in its 
earlier years the Right regarded the Council with something akin to indifference while the 
Left was generous in its contempt for this “derisory cap for a derisory democracy.”
66
  The 
other flaw with an auto-gestation explanation of the 1974 amendment is the relative 
disarray of the Council according to one of its members. François Luchaire, who served 
as a member of the Council from 1965 to 1974, recollects that the Council suffered from 
a lack of institutional solidarity and institutional prestige during most of his tenure.
67
 The 
political nature of Council appointments and the hostility of the government’s political 
opposition depressed morale and even made it difficult for the Secrétaire General to get 
the Council’s members to meet together. According to Luchaire, the Council even 
discussed seriously its own possible demise, as it enjoyed no public support, indeed little 
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public awareness at all.
68
 The Council was thus in no position to push an expansionist 
agenda. Professor Rivero’s verdict on the importance of the 1974 reform is succinct: “In 
1971 the revolution was made possible: the revolution had not yet taken place.” 
It is significant, of course, that the President of the Council, Roger Frey, is at least 
partially responsible for the idea of the 1974 reform. Although Giscard took credit at the 
time, and certainly attached the prestige of his office to the reform, Frey later claimed 
credit for its origin.
69
 Frey could not possibly, however, take credit for its passage. 
Indeed, Frey’s sympathy for the reform put him at odds with several of his fellow 
Gaullist barons who remained in parliament and refused to support the amendment. 
f. Institutional Deference: The Acquiescence of the Conseil d’État 
 Since 1958, France has been host to a hydra-headed judiciary. In a sense, France 
really has three “supreme courts.” Along with the Constitutional Council, there is the 
Cour de Cassation (Court of “breaking” or quashing”). It sits as the highest court of 
appeals in ordinary civil and criminal disputes. It reverses or confirms the decisions of 
lower ordinary courts but has no power to review the constitutionality of government 
acts. The jewel of the French administrative state, however, is the Conseil d’État, or, 
Council of State. Originating under the Napoleonic regime, it strength derives from the 
fact that it wears two hats. It is France’s highest administrative court, adjudicating suits 
against state officials. At the same time, it is the paramount advisory body to the French 
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government. Despite the potential conflict between these two functions, the Council of 
State has evolved as one of the most independent and highly respected institutions in 
France, as well as one of the most—if not the most—prestigious tribunals in Europe. 
Following Conant’s (2002) observation that “no political institution graciously cedes 
authority to another,” one might expect to see evidence that the Council of State opposed 
the Giscard government’s proposal widening the right of referral to the Constitutional 
Council. Several factors suggest why it might interpret its relationship to the 
Constitutional Council as a zero-sum game. 
 Because the Council of State acts as the government’s official legal advisor, it has 
a heavy hand in the drafting of all important government sponsored legislation. In fact, 
Article 39 of the French Constitution mandates that all Government bills be referred to 
the Council of State for non-binding, secret, advisory opinions before they are introduced 
to Parliament. When the Constitutional Council strikes down a law that its sister council 
has approved, it often appears as a reprimand to the Council of State’s legal reasoning. 
This danger is especially acute when the government leaks the advisory opinions of the 
Council of State to the public in advance. An additional factor is the position that the 
Council of State enjoyed prior to 1974 as France’s paramount legal institution. Although 
lacking the power of judicial review over ordinary legislation, it had carefully and 
patiently crafted an impressive rights-based jurisprudence in administrative law rooted in 
“general principles” of law. With the passage of the 1974 amendment, it was only a 
matter of time before the Constitutional Council’s jurisprudence would begin to impose 
itself upon, and in some cases come into conflict with, that of the Council of State. 
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Indeed, the convergence of these two bodies’ jurisprudence after 1974 has been an 
occasionally troubled and still incomplete process. Finally, the members of the Council of 
State are drawn from (and still represent) the elite of the French civil service. Institutional 
identity runs deep among Councilors of State, who combine superb legal training and 
practical political experience, often rotating in and out of Government cabinets as valued 
advisors. In Chapter Four I provide some particularly vivid examples of the Council of 
State’s disdain for its sister institution in the early days. 
There are thus several reasons members of the Council of State might have 
resented and opposed the 1974 amendment empowering the Constitutional Council. I find 
parallels to this situation in the reaction of national courts to the European Court of 
Justice’s threat to their autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s (Alter 1996; Slaughter 1998). 
As in the case of the French Constitutional Council and Council of State, national courts 
faced certain costs in acknowledging the judicial supremacy asserted by the ECJ. Among 
these, potential decline of national courts’ own prestige and disruption of well-developed 
bodies of national jurisprudence figured largely. 
 Despite this, members of the Council failed to oppose the 1974 reform. To the 
contrary, evidence supports the conclusion that the Council of State favored the grant of 
additional avenues of referral to the Constitutional Council. According to one member of 
the Senate’s Law Commission, members of the Council of State had approached him to 
express their support for a proposed (and ultimately failed) amendment that would have 
allowed both the Council of State and the Cour de Cassation to refer constitutional 
questions to the Constitutional Council at their discretion. Such an amendment would 
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have essentially transformed the Council into an appellate body. What explains the 
Council of State’s passivity, even solicitousness, in the face its rival’s empowerment?  I 
suggest two straightforward explanations.  
The first is based on the special character of elite conditioning within the French 
State. Unlike bureaucrats in the United States, members of the Council of State can 
circulate freely between Government cabinets, Parliament and the civil service. This lack 
of institutional segregation, as well as the remarkable prestige and influence of the 
administrative corps, confers upon most of its members what de Gaulle described as “a 
sense of State”. Given their breadth of experience and training, Councilors are not as 
likely to identify narrowly with their institutional interests, as in the case of ordinary civil 
servants, but with the State as a whole. It should be recalled that it was mainly a group of 
young Councilors of State under de Gaulle’s Minister of Justice, Michel Debré (himself a 
Councilor), that designed the first draft of the 5
th
 Republic’s Constitution. It was this draft 
that hatched their institutional competitor, the Constitutional Council, in 1958. Second, 
high level members of the Council of State would probably have recognized that they 
might one day be eligible for service on the Constitutional Council, a capstone position 
for prominent French public servants. At the very least, the Council of State’s modest 
role in the 1974 Amendment would seem to go against accepted notions about the 
narrowly self-interested rationales for organizational behavior.  
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g. Elite Convergence 
My principle argument in Chapter Five draws heavily on the elite paradigm as 
explicated by Field and Higley (1980).
70
 The basic premise of the paradigm is that elites 
drive any significant changes in a society’s politics. Elites are defined as “persons who 
occupy strategic positions in public and private bureaucratic organizations” whose 
positions allow them “to influence the outcomes of national policies individually, 
regularly, and seriously” (alternatively, as those persons who individually, regularly, and 
seriously have the power to affect organizational outcomes”).
71
 A nation’s elites 
generally divide into two categories. They are either “unified” or “disunified.” Elite unity 
is a prerequisite for modern democratic regimes. In such regimes, elites are consensually 
unified, meaning that regime stability does not depend on ideological uniformity but 
rather an agreement to adhere to the basic (peaceful) rules of the game. It is characteristic 
of the opposition within a state having a consensually unified elite “to take publicly 
opposed positions while continuing to respect established institutions and procedures.”
72
 
But how are consensual elites, and thus democratic regimes, established? Not 
easily, according to Field and Higley. Consensual elites are most often the result of a 
sudden and decisive negotiated settlement. In such cases, factions that are politically 
exhausted or facing grave external crisis compact to subordinate their differences and 
abide by rules and procedures. Though hard to achieve, elite settlements are surprisingly 
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durable once in place. The overwhelmingly majority of consolidated democracies in 
existence today are examples of such settlements. The origin of several democratic 
regimes, however, posed difficulties for the clear bifurcation of Field and Higley’s 
unified/disunified paradigm. A handful of states seem rather to fall somewhere in 
between these two categories, manifesting neither the instability, the repression, nor the 
violence typical of disunified elites, but showing no evidence of a sudden elite settlement. 
In these states, democratic institutions persisted for long periods of time without a basic 
consensus among elites. Consensus slowly emerged over time as the elite in opposition 
gradually realized the futility of extra-constitutional and/or violent resistance. France is 
one of these regimes. How should we characterize these regimes? 
Field and Higley identify these hard-to-classify cases as comparatively rare 
examples of a third category, “imperfectly unified elites.” If unified elites “share a 
commitment to defend and abide by existing institutions and rules of political contest,” 
imperfectly unified elites play by the rules only because they feel they have no other 
option.
73
 Imperfectly unified elites (a) occur only at relatively high levels of 
socioeconomic development, and (b) consist of two groupings, a dominant Right and a 
Left in opposition. The Right’s dominance makes it unnecessary to overthrow 
representative institutions, where it enjoys a stable majority, and impractical for the Left 
to attempt to do so. The ensuing status quo is, however, an uneasy one, with the Left “on 
record as intending to alter (the status quo) dramatically if and when they obtain 
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 The Left either questions fundamental institutions of the regime or is suspected 
by the Right of paying lip service to them while plotting to destroy them in the event they 
ever capture power. While armed insurrection is unlikely, the Left attempts to destabilize 
the government through mobilization of sympathetic mass support taking the form of 
protests and industrial strikes. The Left’s inability to capture political power through the 
electoral process while clinging to a program of radical reform gradually takes its toll, 
however, and the Left must ultimately moderate its programs and rhetoric. Slowly and 
grudgingly, it makes peace with existing political institutions. The imperfectly united 
elite becomes a consensual unified elite through the process of convergence, the ultimate 
test of which is a peaceful alteration of power from the Right to the Left through the 
ballot box. 
The scenario described above is essentially a portrait of France between 1958 and 
1980. Field and Higley’s paradigm and description of France enjoys support among a 
number of French political scientists who have identified what Olivier Duhamel calls a 
“mouvement de convergence” transforming the French Socialist and Communist 
parties.
75
 This movement was “progressive, implicit, and undeclared.”
76
 The Left in 
France during the 1960s and 1970s didn’t so much shape the institutions of the 5
th
 
Republic as they were shaped by them. Many factors contributed to the Left’s 
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transformation into a “loyal opposition.” Successful control of local government, 
particularly in large cities like Paris and Marseilles, prevented the Left’s total exclusion 
from power. The relentless feedback provided by electoral returns pressed an ever more 
practical party leadership to moderate a revolutionary agenda. François Mitterand’s 
razor’s edge loss to Valery Giscard d’Estaing in the 1973 presidential election 
emboldened the Socialists; power within existing institutions seemed within reach. For 
the Communists, 1968 had been a chastening year. The Soviet invasion of her socialist 
sister, Czechoslovakia, compelled the PC to burnish its liberal credentials lest the public 
conclude it was a fifth column for Moscow.  A clear bell-weather of internal 
transformation was the PS and PC’s Common Program of 1974. This document overtly 
broke with the Left’s traditional preference for legislative supremacy and conceded the 
5
th
 Republic’s presidential regime. It also looked to an enhanced role for the judiciary and 
placed more emphasis on individual as opposed to “social” liberties. If there was to be a 










5. Elite Convergence and Judicial Review 
The real question may not be why political elites chose to extend the power of 
judicial review, but why the reform failed to go even further than it did. Apart from the 
objection of orthodox Gaullists within the UDR, the primary objection to the 
Government’s reform program was not that it went too far, but that it did not go far 
enough. Analysis in Chapter Five will trace a growing consensus among the Centrists and 
the Left, but most particularly among the Socialists and Communists, for stronger judicial 
review. This development is evident as early as 1964, and is all the more significant 
because it unfolded in tension with the Left’s residual allegiance to the idea of a strong 
parliament. The Communists’ experience as a party of opposition during the 5
th
 
Republic’s formative years seems to have induced a particularly striking conversion, at 
least on paper, to the doctrine of judicial independence. Despite its formal opposition to 
the Government’s proposed amendment in October of 1974, by 1975 it was the 
Communist program that charted the most detailed and far-reaching proposal for a 
Supreme Court á la American. The Socialists had likewise recognized the need for a 
“true” Supreme Court in their official party platforms. 
If the Left voted against the final text of the Government’s proposed amendment at 
the Palais de Congrés, it was not because they opposed judicial review in principle. 
Members of the Left participated in committee discussions attempting to influence the 
ultimate shape of the reform. Nor did the minority oppose it on the basis of strategic 
foresight: by and large, the perception that under the leaves of this liberal rose the thorns 
of judicial imperialism…or even a “poisoned chalice” extended by a receding majority of 
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the (Gaullist) Right…does not seem to have figured significantly into the Left’s 
opposition. The three most common arguments leveled from the benches of the Left 
during parliamentary debates can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The reform of Article 61 was poorly timed. Economic and social problems were pressing and 
more important. The Government’s proposal was merely a “constitutional diversion”. 
(2) The initial reform went too far. The Government’s defeated proposal establishing auto-
saisine, giving the Council jurisdiction to initiate review of legislation at its discretion, was 
anti-democratic and too sweeping. 
(3) And yet, the most acceptable provision of the reform, pertaining to the number of 
parliamentarians required to trigger judicial review, did not go far enough. By leaving 
selection of the Council’s members in the hands of the three Presidents (of the Republic, 
National Assembly and Senate respectively), the Government left the Council a “political 
organ” rather than a true judiciary. Amendments proposed by the Socialists and PC 
(ultimately rejected) aimed simultaneously at de-politicizing the Council’s composition and 
extending its jurisdiction over executive acts. 
In Chapter 5, I will explore how the French Left articulated its own vision of judicial 
review in the years leading up to the 1974 Amendment and in its immediate aftermath. 
While this vision diverged with regard to details within the Socialist and Communist 
parties, its essentials were the same. Prior to the constitutional debates over judicial 
review in 1974, the Left had already officially embraced a liberal or “bourgeois” 
conception of judicial review…a conception it had opposed since 1946.  This conception 
corresponded exceeded the reforms proposed by the French Center-Right. 
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To what extent did this shift in policy symbolize an authentic ideological 
conversion as opposed to a shift in political interest? According to Duhamel (1980), “It is 
not constitutional choices which fix political positions, but political interests which 
modify constitutional positions”.
77
  Does the Left’s conversion to judicial review, like its 
well-explored conversion to presidentialism generally, echo the considerations of a much 
older French politician, Henry IV, who considered Paris to be worth a mass?  While 
Duhamel’s proposition rings true to the average political scientist, I wish to challenge its 
categorical self-assurance. The causal relationship between constitutional values and 
political interests in the emergence of the Constitutional Council did not run in a single 
direction. On the one hand, I argue that the Left’s proposed judicial reforms were a 
principled reconciliation of respect for the parliament with an acknowledgment that they 
were stuck with a presidential system. If presidentialism was a fait accompli, why not 
temper it with judicial oversight? Second, without meaning to be glib, one might answer 
the question above: “Does it matter?” Whether the Socialists indeed had experienced an 
ideological conversion on the road to Damascus or had resigned themselves to an 
acceptance of the once-despised, liberal notion of judicial independence in a thoroughly 
rational exercise of electoral calculus is arguably beside the point. Converge the French 
Left did, as born out by the Socialists’ acceptance of the Constitutional Council’s 
authority during the alternance of 1981-1986.  
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The concept of elite convergence is controversial and somewhat difficult to 
capture empirically. Only a few cases have been identified.
78
 The chapters that follow put 
the role of judicial review at the heart of elite convergence in France. Chapter Two 
summarizes the structure and role of the French Constitutional Council under the 5
th
 
Republic. It examines the background of judicial review in France, the difficulties faced 
by the Council in light of traditional hostility to such review, and efforts by the Council 
to transform itself into a respected legal institution. Understanding the evolution of the 
Council from its creation in 1958 to the eve of its transformation in 1974 is critical to 
understanding the parliamentary debates and prospects for reform as they looked in 
October of that year. Chapter Three draws on official transcripts of the parliamentary 
debates leading to successful passage of the 1974 Amendment. I examine the issues most 
important to those actively engaged in the amendment process and competing, sometimes 
complimentary, motives behind the final votes. I explain why the unanimous 
“opposition” of the Left in the final vote was, appearances to the contrary, not a rejection 
of judicial review. I also look at the cross-cutting institutional issues implicated in the 
debates. In Chapter Four I look at draw on supplementary sources and actors that shed 
light on the events of October 1974. I look to leading newspapers representing various 
points in the political spectrum, the opinions of elites and engaged academics outside of 
Parliament, as well as the official position of the Council of State, the Constitutional 
Council’s primary institutional competitor. What role did non-parliamentary/government 
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actors, if any, play in resolving the events of October 1974? Chapter Five builds on the 
previous two chapters, constructing an argument for the expansion of judicial review in 
France as a symptom of and catalyst for elite convergence. The case rests on official 
party documents, mainly various party platforms of the Left (including the Common 
Program), as well as an examination of the centrist agenda pursued by Giscard’s 
Independent Republicans. Judicial review would not have arrived in France without a 
robust Center-Right party that shared to some degree the Left’s healthy skepticism for the 
institutions bequeathed by General de Gaulle. Chapter 6 compares the elite convergence 
thesis with competing explanations and looks at similarly situated cases (Sweden, 
Austria, New Zealand, Canada, and Israel). It seeks to establish how well, if at all, the 
elite convergence thesis travels. Chapter 7 concludes by analyzing the state of judicial 
review in contemporary France. The principle of judicial review is now well-established 
in French politics and the Council, despite its birth pangs, now enjoys unquestioned 
legitimacy within the political elite. Using relatively recent and untapped polling data 
from France, I examine the nature of elite support for the Council and draw comparisons 
as well as contrasts with elite support for the American Supreme Court and judicial 
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